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1
There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers, and 
in democratic systems of government in which checks and balances 
result in the imposition of restraints by one branch of government 
upon another, there is no separation that is absolute. ... While in the 
USA, France and the Netherlands members of the executive may 
not continue to be members of the legislature, this is not a 
requirement of the German system of separation of powers. 
Moreover, because of the different systems of checks and balances 
that exist in these countries, the relationship between the different 
, provided that: 
  
There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
 
When certifying the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court had to consider 
whether the new Constitution did indeed comply with this principle. In 
responding to challenges raised to the text of the Constitution the Court 
reasoned as follows: 
 
                                            
∗ Judge of the Constitutional Court. South Africa. 
1  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
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branches of government and the power or influence that one branch 
of government has over the other, differs from one country to 
another. 
 
The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises 
the functional independence of branches of government. On the 
other hand, the principle of checks and balances focuses on the 
desirability of ensuring that the constitutional order, as a totality, 
prevents the branches of government from usurping power from one 
another. In this sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable 
intrusion of one branch on the terrain of another. No constitutional 
scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: the scheme is 
always one of partial separation. In Justice Frankfurter’s words, ‘[t]he 
areas are partly interacting, not wholly disjointed’.2
What should be noted is the recognition in the judgment that there is no 
universally accepted system for achieving the separation of powers.
 
 
After a consideration of the challenge, the court held that the Constitution as 
drafted did comply with Constitutional Principle VI in recognising both a 
separation of powers and “appropriate checks and balances” between the three 
branches of government to “ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness”. 
 
3
… no doubt that over time our courts will develop a distinctively 
South African model of separation of powers, one that fits the 
particular system of government provided for in the Constitution and 
that reflects a delicate balancing, informed both by South Africa’s 
history and its new dispensation, between the need, on the one 
hand, to control government by separating powers and enforcing 
 The 
system developed in each country depends on a range of factors including the 
conception of democracy adopted in that country, social, political and economic 
forces, as well as the history of governmental institutions. Indeed, in a later 
case, the Constitutional Court recognised that there is: 
 
                                            
2  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) 
BCLR 1253 (CC); 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at par 108-109.  
3  The diversity of models incorporating the separation of powers is recognised in most 
academic writing on the subject. See eg Barber 2001 Cambridge Law Journal 59; 
Ackerman 2000 Harvard LR 633. 
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checks and balances, and, on the other, to avoid diffusing power so 
completely that the government is unable to take timely measures in 
the public interest.4
Again there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from 
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; 
for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and 
oppression.
 
 
The focus of my talk this evening is to consider how far we have progressed in 
this task of developing a distinctively South African model of the separation of 
powers, but before I turn to that I would like to start with a brief historical 
overview of the doctrine itself. 
 
 
A. The development of the doctrine of the separation of powers and its 
underlying purpose 
 
Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, Montesquieu famously asserted the 
importance of the separation of powers in a democracy as follows: 
  
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; 
because many apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or 
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner. 
 
5
Montesquieu wrote in time to influence significantly both the drafting of the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789
 
 
6
                                            
4  Per Ackermann j in De Lange v Smuts 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC); 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) at 
par 60. 
5  Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws 163. 
6  A 16 of the Rights of Man provides: “Any society in which the safeguarding of rights is not 
assured, and the separation of powers is not observed, has no constitution.” 
 and the framing of the 
Constitution of the United States of America in the 1780s. His thesis was that 
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separating the judicial, executive and legislative powers would enhance the 
liberty of the subject by preventing tyranny, violence and oppression. 
 
In the Federalist Papers, Madison discussed Montesquieu’s idea at some 
length. Madison agreed that: 
 
… the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judici-
ary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny.7
[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the 
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, 
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
  
 
Madison recognised that Montesquieu, who had drawn inspiration from the 
(unwritten) British Constitution, was mistaken in assuming that there was a 
watertight compartmentalisation of the three arms of government in Britain. He 
pointed to the fact that certain members of the upper House also performed 
judicial duties (as is still the case today, though this is, imminently, to be 
changed), that the members of the executive were drawn from the legislature 
and so on. Madison concluded that Montesquieu was not contending for a 
complete separation but for the following principle:  
 
8
… by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its 
several constituent parts may, be their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places.
 
 
Madison went on to conclude that that the separation of powers could serve its 
rightful constitutional purpose: 
 
9
                                            
7  Madison, Hamilton and Jay The Federalist Papers 303. 
8  Id p 304. 
9  Id nr 51 p 319. 
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A central purpose of the separation of powers as conceived by Montesquieu 
and Madison was that it would prevent tyranny and protect liberty. A more 
difficult question that has been asked by political philosophers and 
constitutional lawyers since, is whether in promoting liberty and preventing 
tyranny, the separation of powers must necessarily cause inefficiency. Cass 
Sunstein has argued powerfully that the principle can play such a role: 
 
The system of separation of powers … constrains government, by 
making it harder for government to act; but it does far more than that. 
Separation of powers also helps to energise government and to 
make it more effective, by creating a healthy division of labor. This 
was a prominent argument during the framing period in America. A 
system in which the executive does not bear the burden of 
adjudication may well strengthen the executive by removing from it a 
task that frequently produces public disapproval. If the president 
does not adjudicate, he is able to pursue his task unencumbered by 
judicial burdens. Indeed, the entire framework enables rather than 
constrains democracy, not only by creating an energetic executive 
but more fundamentally by allowing the sovereign people to pursue a 
strategy against their government of divide and conquer. So long as 
it is understood that no branch of government is actually the 
“people”, a system of separation of powers can allow the citizenry to 
monitor and constrain its inevitably imperfect agents. And a system 
of separated powers also proliferates the points of access to 
government, allowing people to succeed (for example) within the 
legislature even if they are blocked or unheard within the executive 
or judicial branches.10
It seems clear that while, perhaps the guiding principles underlying the 
philosophical development of the doctrine relate to the importance of preventing 
the abuse of power, the doctrine has come to serve other roles in many 
democracies. In particular, it has ensured the functional specialisation of the 
arms of government, not entirely, but to some significant extent. Moreover, in at 
least some systems, including ours, it plays a role enhancing of human rights, 
 
 
                                            
10  Sunstein Designing Democracy 98-99. See also Barber cited above n 3 who suggests that 
the guiding principle of separation of powers is efficiency. 
K O'REGAN  PER/PELJ 2005(8)1 
125/150 
 
and of a particular vision of democracy, based on the key democratic founding 
values of our Constitution – accountability, responsiveness and openness.11
Under our Constitution, the President is elected by the National Assembly (one 
of the two houses of Parliament) from among its members at its first sitting after 
an election.
 
 
To illustrate this, it is necessary first to look at the division of powers provided 
within the text of the Constitution; and then turn to consider how the courts 
have approached the issue in the last ten years. 
 
 
B. The South African constitutional model 
 
A brief review of the South African Constitution makes it plain that the various 
branches of government are not hermetically sealed from one another. In 
particular, our Constitution opted for a model of the relationship between the 
legislature and executive, modelled more closely on the Westminster system, 
than on the presidential system found in France and the United States.  
 
12 That election is presided over by the Chief Justice.13 Once the 
President is elected she or he ceases to be a member of the National 
Assembly.14
                                            
11  S 1 of the Constitution provides that: 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founding on the 
following values: 
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a 
multi-party system of democratic government to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
12  S 86(1) of the Constitution. 
13  S 86(2) of the Constitution. 
14  S 87 of the Constitution. 
 Moreover it is the National Assembly who may remove the 
President from an office, on a vote of at least two thirds of its members and 
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only on the grounds of: (a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law; (b) 
serious misconduct; and (c) inability to perform the functions of office.15
The Deputy President too must be appointed from among the members of the 
National Assembly,
 
 
16 as must all, save two, of the other members of Cabinet.17 
Members of the Cabinet who are not members of Parliament, and the 
President, have right to attend and speak in the National Assembly but they do 
not have the right to vote.18 Members of the Cabinet are accountable 
collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and 
the performance of their functions19 and must report regularly to Parliament.20
It is the President that dissolves Parliament, upon a resolution of a majority in 
Parliament calling for dissolution, as long as three years has passed since the 
last election.
  
 
21
The process of legislation-making too illustrates the intertwined relationship 
between legislature and executive. Members of the Cabinet prepare and initiate 
legislation
  
 
22 which is then introduced either into the National Assembly or the 
National Council of Provinces for debate and passing. Once a bill has been 
passed by Parliament, it is presented to the President for signature.23 The 
President has limited powers to refuse to assent to a bill. He may refuse to sign 
the bill if he has reservations about its constitutionality in which case he must 
refer it back to the National Assembly for reconsideration.24
                                            
15  S 89 of the Constitution. 
16  S 91(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
17  S 91(3)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
18  S 54 of the Constitution. 
19  S 92(2) of the Constitution. 
20  S 92(3)(b) of the Constitution. 
21  S 50 of the Constitution. 
22  S 85(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
23  S 79 of the Constitution. 
24  S 79 of the Constitution. 
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If once it is referred back to the President, he or she still entertains doubts 
about its constitutionality, the bill must be referred to the Constitutional Court.25 
This has only happened once since the Constitution came into force in 1997 
when President Mandela referred the Liquor Bill to the Constitutional Court for 
consideration in March 1999.26
                                            
25  S 79(5) of the Constitution, see also s 167(4)(b) of the Constitution which makes it plain 
that only the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to entertain such a referral.  
26  See Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa: in re constitutionality of the Liquor 
Bill 2000 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2000 (1) SA 732 (CC). 
 
 In that case the court made it plain that the task 
for the court was to consider the reservations expressed by the President, not 
to undertake a mini-certification of the bill. It left open the question whether it 
could in such proceedings consider the constitutionality of provisions not 
referred to by the President which are in obvious conflict with the Constitution. It 
did, however, make plain that any finding by the court that the bill is 
constitutional does not preclude subsequent challenges on other issues once 
the bill is enacted. 
 
The functions conferred on the legislature too illustrate the particular South 
African conception of the separation of powers. The Constitution emphasises 
that its powers are not only to make legislation: but to ensure government by 
people under the Constitution. Section 42(3) provides: 
 
The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to 
ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this 
by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinising 
and overseeing executive action. 
 
Similarly section 55(2) provides that: 
 
The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms to – 
 
(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national 
sphere of government are accountable to it; and 
(b) to maintain oversight of 
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(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including 
the implementation of legislation; and 
(ii) any organ of state. 
 
The legislature’s role in overseeing executive action and holding the executive 
accountable for the performance of its obligations is an important aspect of the 
separation of powers under our Constitution. 
 
Another important aspect of separation of powers, but one beyond the scope of 
my discussion this evening, is the role of the provinces and local government 
as separate spheres of government, although with large areas of concurrence 
with national government. The principles underlying this division of powers, and 
their factual consequences, require separate consideration of its own. 
 
The judiciary  
 
The Constitution makes plain that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested 
in the courts and that they are … 
 
… independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice.27
… organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must 
assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.
 
 
Moreover, no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the 
courts and …  
 
28
Judges are appointed by the President “on the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission”,
 
 
29
                                            
27  S 165(2) of the Constitution. 
28  S 165(4) of the Constitution. 
 a body whose composition is provided for in the Constitution. It 
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has 23 permanent members including the Chief Justice, who presides, the 
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Minister of Justice, one Judge 
President, two advocates, two attorneys, a university law professor, six 
members of the National Assembly, at least three of whom must be members 
of opposition parties and four delegates from the NCOP, as well as four 
persons designated by the President. In addition, the Judge President and 
Premier, or their delegates, join the commission in respect of the appointment 
of judges to the High Court situated in that province.  
 
Judges are removed by the President only if the Judicial Service Commission 
has found the judge to suffer from an incapacity or to be grossly incompetent or 
guilty of gross misconduct and if two-thirds of the members of the National 
Assembly call for his or her removal. 
 
In considering the role of the judiciary under our Constitution, its powers and 
functions must be considered. First, it is clear in our constitutional order that the 
judiciary must uphold the Constitution. Secondly, citizens are entitled to turn to 
the judiciary to protect their constitutional rights. Accordingly, section 172 of the 
Constitution requires a court deciding a constitutional issue within its jurisdiction 
to declare invalid any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution.30
It should also be noted that the Constitutional Court is given a very special role 
in relation to monitoring the separation of powers and holding the legislature 
and executive to the text of the Constitution. The closer an issue comes to the 
sensitive relationship between the branches of government, the more likely it is 
to require a decision by the Constitutional Court. So no national or provincial 
legislation or any conduct of the President may be declared invalid effectively 
without the confirmation of the Constitutional Court.
 This is 
a powerful role given to the judiciary to ensure observance of the constitution.  
 
31
                                                                                                                               
29  S174(6) of the Constitution. 
30 Insert s 172(1) of the Constitution. 
31 See s 172(2) of the Constitution. 
 In addition, no 
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constitutional challenge to constitutional amendments may be decided by a 
court other than the Constitutional Court.32 Similarly, disputes between organs 
of state concerning their constitutional status, powers or functions may only be 
decided by the Constitutional Court.33 Our Constitution clearly envisages an 
important role for the courts, the closer however the issues before the courts 
come to the sensitive area of the separation of powers, the more likely the 
decision will have to be made by the Constitutional Court. It is not surprising 
then that there are special tenure provisions for Constitutional Court judges,34 
and special appointment provisions.35
Although there was a multiplicity of judgments, all members of the court held 
that this delegation was impermissible. There was some debate amongst the 
 
 
 
C. Constitutional jurisprudence on the separation of powers 
 
(a) Relationship between Legislature and Executive 
 
One of the earliest cases considered by the Court dealt with the relationship 
between the legislature and the executive and, in particular, the question 
whether the Legislature could delegate to the executive the power to amend 
legislation passed by the Legislature. The case was called Executive Council, 
Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA. It arose in the context of the 
transformation of local government, a complex task facing government in the 
mid-1990s. A key legal issue in the case concerned section 16A of the Local 
Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 subsection 1 of which provided that: 
 
The President may amend this act and any schedule thereto by 
proclamation in the Gazette. 
 
                                            
32 S 167(4)(d) of the Constitution. 
33 S 167(4)(a) of the Constitution. 
34 See s 176(1) of the Constitution. 
35 See s 174(4) of the Constitution. 
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judgments as to the circumstances in which such a delegation could, if ever, be 
made.  
 
The key principle underlying all the judgments is the protection of the proper 
sphere of the legislature – law making. This principle asserts there is good 
constitutional reason for preserving the power to make and amend national 
laws as a power peculiar to the legislature. This is an important aspect of South 
African separation of powers, that the separation between judicial, legislative 
and executive – while not monolithic – underlies a structural and functional 
distinction between the arms of government which in order to preserve their 
institutional integrity and their democratic function, needs to be preserved from 
intrusion. 
 
One of the important provisions of our constitution entrenches the principles of 
co-operative government. Chapter 3 of the Constitution provides principles of 
co-operative government which requires all spheres of government and organs 
of state to “co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith”.36 
Notably, section 41(1)(h)(vi) provides that spheres of government should avoid 
legal proceedings against one another. In at least one case, the Constitutional 
Court has declined to decide a matter on the basis that organs of state had not 
sought to resolve their differences before the institution of litigation.37
                                            
36  S 41(1)(h) of the Constitution and see other provisions of ch 3. 
37  Uthukela District Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (11) BCLR 
1220 (CC); 2003 (1) SA 678 (CC). S 5(1) of the Division of Revenue Act 1 of 2001 made 
no provision for revenue to be paid to municipalities which perform co-ordinating functions 
(in terms of s 155 of the Constitution). It was challenged by certain municipalities that 
perform such functions and they sought confirmation from the Constitutional Court. By the 
time the matter came before the court the legislation had been repealed. The court 
exercised its discretion not to confirm the order of invalidity, inter alia on the basis that the 
organs of state had not endeavoured to resolve their differences politically before resorting 
to litigation. 
 This 
principle, too, asserts the primacy of the co-operative principles of government 
entrenched in the Constitution and demonstrates a reluctance to permit organs 
of state to avoid co-operative resolution of conflict in favour of litigation. 
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(b) Relationship between Legislature and Judiciary 
 
Perhaps the most important case on the relationship between the legislature 
and the judiciary in the first ten years was the SCA decision concerning 
Parliament’s powers to discipline members: Speaker of the National Assembly 
v De Lille. The case arose from an incident in the National Assembly in which 
one of its opposition members, Ms Patricia De Lille, stated that she had 
information that 12 members of the governing party, the African National 
Congress, had been spies for the apartheid government. When challenged, she 
mentioned eight names some of whom were not members of the National 
Assembly. The Speaker ruled that it was unparliamentary to refer to some 
members of the Assembly as “spies” and ordered her to withdraw her remarks 
which she did. Some days later a motion was passed in the Assembly 
appointed an ad hoc committee to report to the Assembly on what action 
should be taken in view of Ms De Lille’s remarks. The committee was convened 
and recommended that Ms De Lille be directed to apologise and to suspend her 
for 15 parliamentary working days. The National Assembly adopted this 
recommendation. 
 
Ms De Lille went to court to challenge the resolution of the National Assembly. 
The Cape High Court upheld her challenge and set aside the resolution and the 
Speaker of the Assembly then appealed to the SCA. The SCA held that the 
question that had to be considered was whether Parliament had any “lawful 
authority to take any steps to suspend” one of its members in these 
circumstances. The Speaker argued that section 57 of the Constitution38
                                            
38  S 57 reads: 
(1) The National Assembly may- 
(a) determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures; 
and 
(b) make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to 
representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and 
public involvement. 
(2) The rules and orders of the National Assembly must provide for- 
 which 
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permits the National Assembly “to determine and control its internal 
arrangements” was the source of its power. Mahomed cj reasoned as follows: 
 
The threat that a member of the Assembly may be suspended for 
something said in the assembly inhibits freedom of expression in the 
Assembly and must therefore adversely impact on that guarantee. 
Section 58(2) must not be interpreted … so as to detract from that 
guarantee.39
It is clear from the court’s jurisprudence that the principle of non-intrusion is an 
important aspect of our doctrine of separation of powers, if not absolute. In 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Others: in re: Ex parte 
Application of the President of the RSA and Others, the court was concerned 
 
 
The SCA accordingly set aside that portion of the Assembly’s resolution which 
had ordered the suspension of Ms De Lille from Parliament. This judgment 
demonstrates a principle of the separation of powers which makes clear that 
the judiciary recognises that it is its role to uphold fundamental rights, and that 
separation of powers concerns cannot be used to render organs of state, 
including the legislature itself, immune from constitutional challenge based on 
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. The court is saying that the role of 
the courts under our constitutional order requires courts to intervene to protect 
rights and that, accordingly, the principle of non-intrusion with the affairs of 
another branch of government, an important aspect of the separation of powers 
must give way to the need to provide protection for individual rights which lie at 
the heart of our democratic order. 
 
                                                                                                                               
(a) the establishment, composition, powers, functions, procedures and duration of 
its committees; 
(b) the participation in the proceedings of the Assembly and its committees of 
minority parties represented in the Assembly, in a manner consistent with 
democracy; 
(c) financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the 
Assembly in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leader 
to perform their functions in the Assembly effectively; and 
(d) the recognition of the leader of the largest opposition party in the Assembly as 
the Leader of the Opposition. 
39  At par 20. 
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with the power of the President to bring legislation into force. Section 55 of the 
South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act 132 of 
1998, provided that the act would come into operation on a date to be 
determined by the President in the Gazette. On 30 April 1999, the President 
issued a proclamation purporting to bring the legislation into force. However, it 
subsequently became clear that the purported promulgation had been 
premature in that the necessary regulations to ensure that the act would 
function had not been prepared or issued by the Minister of Health. 
Accordingly, the President and the Minister of Health applied to have the 
proclamation bringing the legislation into force set aside. The court observed 
that there was a question of justiciability which arose: courts in other 
jurisdictions have been reluctant to review the exercise of an executive decision 
to bring legislation into force because it is so close to the legislative process.40
The power is derived from legislation and is close to the 
administrative process. In my view, however, the decisions to bring 
the law into operation did not constitute administrative action. When 
he purported to exercise the power, the President was neither 
making the law, nor administering it. Parliament had made the law, 
and the executive would administer it once it had been brought into 
force. The power vested in the President thus lies between the law-
making process and the administrative process. The exercise of that 
power requires a political judgment as to when the legislation should 
be brought into force, a decision that is necessarily antecedent to the 
implementation of the legislation which comes into force only when 
the power is exercised. In substance the exercise of the power is 
closer to the legislative process than the administrative process.
 
In considering the nature of the power, Chaskalson cj reasoned as follows: 
 
41
 
 
 
The court held that the power, even though not administrative in character, was 
subject to constitutional review on the grounds of lawfulness and rationality. 
The court held: 
                                            
40  See eg Re Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-9 (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 699 (SCC) at 712; R 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigade Union [1995] 2 AC 
513 (HL); AK Roy v Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271. 
41 Id at par 79. 
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It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power 
by the executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. 
Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the 
power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and 
inconsistent with this requirement.42
                                            
42 Id at par 85. 
 
 
The court held that in the circumstances of that case the proclamation issued 
by the President had not been rationally related to a purpose for which the 
power to issue the proclamation had been given to the President and ordered 
that the proclamation be set aside. 
 
Another case which has considered the relationship between Parliament and 
the Courts has been a case which considered the extent to which Parliament 
may intrude on the domain of the judiciary. In S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 
(CC); 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC), the question that arose was whether minimum 
sentence legislation enacted by the legislature was consistent with the 
Constitution. Section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
makes it obligatory for a High Court to sentence an accused, convicted of 
certain specified offences, to imprisonment for life unless the court is satisfied 
that “substantial and compelling circumstances” exist justifying the imposition of 
a lesser sentence. Ackermann j reasoned as follows: 
 
There is under our Constitution no absolute separation of powers 
between the judicial function, on the one had, and the legislative and 
executive on the other. When the nature and process of punishment 
is considered in its totality, it is apparent that all three branches of 
the state play a functional role and must necessarily do so. No 
judicial punishment can take place unless the person to be punished 
has been convicted of an offence which either under the common 
law or statute carries with it a punishment. It is pre-eminently the 
function of the legislature to determine what conduct should be 
criminalised and punished. Even here the separation is not 
complete, because this function of the legislature is checked by the 
Constitution in general and by the Bill of Rights in particular, and 
such checks are enforced through the courts. 
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Both the legislature and executive share an interest in the 
punishment to be imposed by courts, both in regard to its nature and 
severity. They have a general interest in sentencing policy, penology 
and the extent to which correctional institutions are used to further 
the various objectives of punishment.43
The legislature’s powers are decidedly not unlimited. Legislation is 
by nature general. It cannot provide for each individually determined 
case. Accordingly such power ought not, on general constitutional 
principles, wholly to exclude the important function and power of a 
court to apply and adapt a general principle to the individual case. 
What an appropriate balance ought to be is incapable of 
comprehensive abstract formulation, but must be decided as specific 
challenges arise. In the field of sentencing, however, it can be 
stated, as a matter of principle, that the legislature ought not to 
oblige the judiciary to impose a punishment which is wholly lacking in 
proportionality to the crime. This would be inimical to the rule of law 
and the constitutional state.
 
 
He continued: 
  
44
Adopting the interpretive approach to the sections identified by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA), it held the provisions to 
be consistent with the Constitution.
 
 
45 In this case, the court accepted the 
legitimacy of minimum sentences as long as the court’s constitutional role of 
doing justice in individual cases remained possible. The minimum sentence 
legislation permits a court not to impose a sentence if there are “substantial and 
compelling circumstances” which require the imposition of a lesser sentence.46
 
 
In Malgas, the SCA interpreted that provision to permit a court not to impose a 
minimum sentence if that sentence would be disproportionate to the crime so 
that injustice would be done by imposing the sentence. 
                                            
43  At par 22 and 23. 
44  Id at par 26. 
45  The relevant passage in S v Malgas provided as follows: “If the sentencing court on 
consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is satisfied that they render the 
prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal 
and the needs of society, so that an injustice would be done by imposing the sentence, it is 
entitled to impose a lesser sentence.” (par 25 of Malgas, cited at par 40 of Dodo). 
46  S 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
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(c) Relationship between Executive and Judiciary 
 
Perhaps one of the most difficult areas of constitutional jurisprudence involves 
the relationship between the executive and the judiciary. The executive has a 
crucial and powerful role in any modern democracy. One of the key functions of 
the executive, recognised by both Madison and Montesquieu, is the conduct of 
foreign affairs.  
 
Nevertheless, as section 172 of the Constitution suggests, under our 
constitutional order even the conduct closest to the pure executive, is to some 
extent justiciable. In a recent case, Kaunda v President of the RSA 2004 (10) 
BCLR 1009 (CC); 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC), the court had to consider the 
executive’s power to make diplomatic representations under international law to 
other states on behalf of its citizens. This power lies close to the heartland of 
executive power. The case concerned 69 South African citizens, who had been 
arrested in Zimbabwe when their plane had landed there and were being held 
in custody there. It was alleged that these 69 were mercenaries en route to 
Equatorial Guinea to overthrow the government of that country. The applicants 
sought a range of relief, including an order declaring that the government of 
South Africa was under an obligation firstly to extradite the applicants to South 
Africa for them to be criminally prosecuted here; secondly, to take steps to 
protect the applicants in relation to their conditions of imprisonment in 
Zimbabwe and thirdly to make diplomatic representations on their behalf to 
prevent their being extradited to Equatorial Guinea where the applicants 
alleged they would not receive a fair trial. 
 
The court held that the applicants could not seek in their first claim – that they 
be extradited to South Africa – on the ground that as it was not conceded on 
the papers that there was prima facie evidence that they were guilty of a 
criminal offence, and given that the state said that it had no such evidence at 
that stage, the jurisdictional requisites for extradition did not exist. As to the 
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obligation of the state to make diplomatic representations on their behalf, a 
majority of the court (per Chaskalson cj) held that section 3 of the Constitution47
If … citizens have a right to request government to provide them with 
diplomatic protection, then government must have a corresponding 
obligation to consider the request and deal with it consistently with 
the constitution. … [T]here may even be a duty in extreme cases for 
the government to act on its own initiative. This, however, is a terrain 
in which courts must exercise discretion and recognise that 
government is better placed than they are to deal with such 
matters.
 
entitles citizens to request diplomatic protection and that: 
 
48
There may thus be a duty on government consistent with its 
obligations under international law, to take action to protect one of its 
citizens against a gross abuse of international human rights norms. 
A request to the government for assistance in such circumstances 
where the evidence is clear would be difficult, and in extreme cases 
possibly impossible to refuse. It is unlikely that such a request would 
ever be refused by government, but if it were, the decision would be 
justiciable and a court could order the government to take 
appropriate action.
 
 
Chaskalson cj continued: 
 
49
All the judgments in the matter recognised that the arena of making diplomatic 
representations is one in which the executive has a particular and special 
competence and that a court should be slow to dictate to the executive how to 
carry out that task.
 
 
50
                                            
47  S 3 provides as follows:  
(1) There is a common South African citizenship. 
(2) All citizens are – 
(a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and 
(b) equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. 
(3) National legislation must provide for the acquisition, loss and restoration of 
citizenship. 
48  Id at par 67. 
49  Id at par 69. Compare the judgment of Ngcobo j at par 191 and myself at par 238. 
50  See the judgment of Chaskalson cj at par 77; Ngcobo j at par 189 and myself at par 243 ff.  
 Yet all of them also recognised that the power was to 
some, greater or lesser extent, justiciable despite that competence. The 
principles underlying Kaunda (and the differences in the judgments authored in 
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the case) illustrate the court wrestling to find the appropriate balance between 
two powerful principles of our constitutional order, both relevant to the doctrine 
of the separation of powers. The first is the need to protect the executive 
domain from impermissible intrusion by the judiciary; and the other is the need 
to ensure that citizens’ rights are protected where possible.  
 
The court has on two other occasions recognised that the presidential powers 
conferred specifically on the President by section 84(2) of the Constitution, 
despite their clear executive character are under our Constitution justiciable to 
some extent.51 In Hugo’s case, the court held that the power to pardon 
offenders was nevertheless justiciable,52 and in SARFU 3, the court held that 
the power to appoint commissions of inquiry was similarly justiciable on limited 
grounds.53
                                            
51  S 84(2) provides: 
The President is responsible for- 
(a) assenting to and signing Bills; 
(b) referring a Bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration of the Bill's 
constitutionality; 
(c) referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill's 
constitutionality; 
(d) summoning the National Assembly, the National Council of Provinces or 
Parliament to an extraordinary sitting to conduct special business; 
(e) making any appointments that the Constitution or legislation requires the 
President to make, other than as head of the national executive; 
(f) appointing commissions of inquiry; 
(g) calling a national referendum in terms of an Act of Parliament; 
(h) receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; 
(i) appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular 
representatives; 
(j) pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or 
forfeitures; and 
(k) conferring honours. 
52  President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
53  President of the RSA v South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU 3) 1999 (10) BCLR 
1059 (CC); 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
 The role of the courts in our constitutional democracy, as is 
foreshadowed by some of the provisions in the text of the Constitution, referred 
to earlier is clearly to protect the Constitution and to hold both the executive 
and legislature accountable to the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
in Kaunda, SARFU and Hugo, the court recognised that there are clear 
constitutional reasons why the justiciability of purely executive decisions is far 
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narrower than that of administrative decisions, and that it is appropriate for 
courts to defer to the executive’s special role and expertise in purely executive 
matters. 
 
The court has also spoken sharply to protect the executive, and particularly the 
President, from undue intrusion by the courts. In SARFU 3, for example, the 
High Court had called the President as a witness in a dispute surrounding the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry. The question was whether courts could 
call the President as a witness. In responding to this argument, the court 
reasoned: 
 
A review of the law of foreign jurisdictions fails to reveal a case in 
which a head of State has been compelled to give oral evidence 
before a court in relation to the performance of official duties. Even 
where a head of State may be called as a witness, special 
arrangements are often provided for the way in which such evidence 
is given. There is no doubt that courts are obliged to ensure that the 
status, dignity and efficiency of the office of the President is 
protected. At the same time however the administration of justice 
cannot and should not be impeded by a court’s desire to ensure that 
the dignity of the President is safeguarded. 
 
We are of the view that there are two aspects of the public interest 
which might conflict in cases where a decision must be made as to 
whether the President ought to be ordered to give evidence. On the 
one hand, there is the public interest in ensuring that the dignity and 
status of the President is preserved and protected, that the efficiency 
of the executive is not impeded and that a robust and open 
discussion take place unhindered at meetings of the Cabinet when 
sensitive and important matters of policy are discussed. Careful 
consideration must therefore be given to a decision compelling the 
President to give evidence and such an order should not be made 
unless the interests of justice clearly demand that this be done. The 
judiciary must exercise appropriate restraint in such cases, sensitive 
to the status of the head of State and the integrity of the executive 
arm of government. On the other hand, there is the equally important 
need to ensure that the courts are not impeded in the administration 
of justice.54
                                            
54  SARFU 3, cited above n 50 at par 242 and 243. 
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The court concluded that the High Court in that case had not carefully 
considered whether it was necessary to call the President and held that it had 
erred in doing so. What is clear from this discussion again is that there are 
countervailing considerations within the separation of powers doctrine itself 
which require to be resolved in the concrete circumstances of a particular case. 
 
In areas less close to the presidential, the court has also made it plain that in 
constitutional adjudication it is proper to recognise the important role of the 
executive under the constitution and not to trample unduly on the proper terrain 
of the executive branch of government. The court has also emphasised the 
need for effective government in South Africa to ensure that the transformation 
of our broader society is not hampered by undue weakening of the executive 
arm of government’s ability to pursue these goals. 
 
For example, in Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of State-aided 
Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC); 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC), the 
court held that: 
 
In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, 
a court should be slow to impose obligations upon government which 
will inhibit its ability to make and implement policy effectively (a 
principle well recognised in the common law and that of other 
countries). As a young democracy facing immense challenges of 
transformation, we cannot deny the importance of the need to 
ensure the ability of the executive to act efficiently and promptly.55
Similarly, the court has recognised that it is important to protect the right of the 
executive to formulate and implement policy.
 
 
56
In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the 
appropriate respect, a court is recognising the proper role of the 
 In a recent decision, it reasoned 
as follows: 
 
                                            
55  At par 41. 
56  See eg Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 
(4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 46-54 and par 104. 
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executive within the Constitution. In doing so a court should be 
careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to maters 
entrusted to other branches of government. A court should thus give 
due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those 
with special expertise and experience in the field. The extent to 
which a court should give weight to these considerations will depend 
upon the character of the decision itself, as well as on the identity of 
the decision-maker. A decision that requires an equilibrium to be 
struck between a range of competing interests or considerations and 
which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise 
in that area must be shown respect by the courts. This does not 
mean however that where the decision is one which a will not 
reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not 
reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of 
the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision. A court 
should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because 
of the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-
maker.57
The Court has held that it will consider whether policies adopted are 
reasonable, and in particular, has held that policies which ignore the plight of 
the most vulnerable will not be reasonable.
 
 
Perhaps the most difficult area under our Constitution for this balance to be 
struck is in the area of socio-economic rights. In that area, the Constitution 
requires that the state take … 
 
… reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights.  
 
58
                                            
57  Id at par 48. 
58  See Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1160 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) at par 44. 
 This area of our jurisprudence 
attracts much attention from political scientists, as well as lawyers abroad. One 
of the reasons for this is the recognition that holding the government to account 
in the field of socio-economic rights, which lie at the heart of decision about 
allocation and policy priorities, challenges conventional views of the role of 
courts in a democracy.  
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The separation of powers tension here lies in ensuring that the rights of citizens 
to have their basic daily needs met is not ignored, while also recognising that 
courts, in particular, are institutionally unsuited to the task of make allocative 
budgetary decisions and designing complex social programmes.59
In sum, officers in the public service, who answer to higher officials 
in the executive branch, do not enjoy the independence of the 
judiciary and therefore, cannot, without danger to liberty, commit to 
prison witnesses who refuse to cooperate in proceedings, such as 
the present.
 
 
 
(d) The proper role of judges  
 
The last area I wish to turn to raises the issue of the proper constitutional 
function of judges in our democracy. In the first case to consider this matter, De 
Lange v Smuts, the court was faced with a power given to commissioners 
presiding in insolvency enquiries to commit to prison witnesses who refused to 
answer a question satisfactorily. The court held that it would be inappropriate 
for such a power to be exercised by a person who was not a member of the 
judiciary. After a consideration of a range of foreign jurisdictions in relation to 
this question, Ackermann j concluded as follows: 
 
60
On the other hand, in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v 
Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC), the court held that again 
the particular institutional role of the judiciary meant that there were certain 
 
 
This judgment asserts the peculiar institutional character and function of the 
judiciary in our conception of the separation of powers and asserts that the 
power to deprive recalcitrant witnesses of their liberty should be preserved for 
the judiciary.  
 
                                            
59  See the seminal piece by Fuller 1978 Harvard LR 353. 
60  N 4 above at par 75. 
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public functions which it was inappropriate for judges to perform. The case 
concerned the Special Investigating Unit established under the Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996, which unit came to be 
known as the Heath Commission. The question that arose crisply in the case 
was whether it was appropriate for judge Heath to head that unit. The powers of 
the unit involved investigation and litigation on behalf of the state to recover 
monies lost to the state through corruption. The court concluded that: 
 
The functions that the head of the SIU is required to perform are far 
removed from “the central mission of the judiciary”. They are 
determined by the President who formulates and can amend the 
allegations to be investigated. If regard is had to all the 
circumstances, including the intrusive quality of the investigations 
that are carried out by the SIU, the inextricable link between the SIU 
as investigator and the SIU as litigator on behalf of the State, and the 
indefinite nature of the appointment which precludes the head of the 
unit from performing his judicial functions, the first respondent’s 
position as head of the SIU is … incompatible with his judicial office 
and contrary to the separation of powers required by the 
Constitution.61
In the last case which I wish to mention, the court had to consider a series of 
wide-ranging challenges to the legislation regulating magistrates’ courts on the 
 
 
Of particular importance to the court’s conclusion was effect on the perceived 
independence of the judiciary by the public that might arise when a judge 
performs tasks that are executive in character at the behest of the executive. 
The court held that it was important that the judiciary be seen to be 
independent because otherwise the judiciary’s ability to properly discharge its 
functions under the Constitution might be threatened. This reasoning, once 
again, asserts a vision of the separation of powers which recognises the need 
to protect the institutional character of each of the three arms of government in 
a manner which will prevent their ability to discharge their constitutional role 
being undermined. 
 
                                            
61  Par 45. 
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grounds that it fell short of protecting the independence of the judiciary as the 
Constitution requires.62
Judicial officers must act independently and impartially in the 
discharge of their duties. In addition … the courts in which they hold 
office must exhibit institutional independence. This involves an 
independence in the relationship between the courts and the other 
arms of government.
 This occurred in the case of Van Rooyen v S 2002 (8) 
BCLR 810 (CC); 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC). Time does not permit a full 
consideration of the issues in that case. Perhaps the most important aspect of 
the case was its conclusion that the protection of the independence of the 
judiciary, crucial as it is to our doctrine of separation of powers, requires more 
than preventing interference with the task of judicial decision-making. As 
Chaskalson cj reasoned: 
 
63
What is clear form the jurisprudence that has so far emerged is that the 
doctrine of separation of powers in our Constitution contains a variety of 
principles which are often in tension with one another in the circumstances of 
particular cases. Some of these principles can be identified: first, while clearly 
not absolute, the doctrine of the separation of powers rests on a functional 
understanding of the powers and requires that each institution’s character and 
competence to perform these powers be protected. The role of the courts under 
our Constitution is to protect the Constitution, and in particular individual 
fundamental rights. At times, in asserting this function, courts will have to 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                            
62  The legislation challenged included provisions of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993, the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and the regulations for judicial officers in the lower 
courts, 1993 (promulgated in GG 15524 GN R361 1994; and Complaints Procedure 
regulations promulgated in GG 19309 GN R1240 1998). 
63  Par 31. 
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intrude to some extent on the terrain of the legislature and the executive, as we 
saw in De Lille and in many other cases.  
 
In doing so, however, it is clear from the jurisprudence that is emerging that 
court’s must remain sensible to the legitimate constitutional interests of the 
other arms of government and seek to ensure that the manner of their intrusion, 
while protecting fundamental rights, intrudes as little as possible in the terrain of 
the executive and legislature.  
 
The principle of separation of powers under our constitutional order requires not 
only the need to protect against the abuse of power, in the Montesquieuian or 
Madisonian sense, but also to ensure that the efficiency and institutional 
integrity of each arm of government. We may not yet have achieved a fully 
articulated doctrine of the separation of powers, but certain ground rules have 
been clearly set, drawing on the overall vision of the Constitution. 
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